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"Mechanical Arts and Merchandise"
Canadian Public Administration
in the New Economy
H.W. Arthurs*
The "New Economy", with its attendant trends
and consequences, presents a number of distinct chal-
lenges to Canadian public administration. The key
features of the New Economy - changes in technol-
ogy and the social organization of work, globalization
and regional economic integration, and shifts in the
boundary between the state and civil society - de-
mand a reconsideration of the ways in which we have
previously thought about bureaucracy, government,
and the role of the interventionist state. These changes
in our political economy have profoundly destabilized
Canadian public administration and require us to find
new ways to cope with their collective effects. The so-
lutions we choose will dictate what our public admini-
stration will look like in the New Economy, in this, the
"declining age" of the Canadian state.
In addition to exploring the impact of the New
Economy on public administration, the author also
considers how various strategies said to be appropriate
for its reform are likely to play themselves out in the
context of the New Economy. Traditionally, the three
main strategies that have been proposed for the reform
of public administration are increased legal control of
the administration, enhanced professionalism in the
public service, and greater democratic participation.
The author suggests that these strategies are outmoded
and will not likely be successful in the context of the
New Economy. A fourth strategy, of more recent vin-
tage, is that of reinventing public administration as a
market. The author concludes that this strategy of
"marketization" will result in dramatic changes in the
way we view the role of government and public ad-
ministration.
La (Nouvelle tconomie>> et les tendances et con-
sdquences qui l'accompagnent, prdsentent de nom-
breux ddfis pour 'administration publique canadienne.
Les 6ldments-cl6 de la Nouvelle ,conomie - les chan-
gement technologiques et l'organisation sociale du tra-
vail, la globalisation et l'int6gration &onomique r~gio-"
nale de meme que le d6placement des fronti~res entre
l'6tat et la soci& civile - requi rent une remise en
question des anciennes fagons de concevoir la bureau-
cratie, le gouvemement et le r6le interventionniste de
l'6tat. Ces changements dans notre eonomie politique
ont profonddment ddstabilis6 l'administration publique
canadienne; il importe de trouver de nouveaux moyens
de faire face h leur effet combin6. Les solutions que
nous choisirons seront ddterminantes quant t l'aspect
que prendra notre administration publique A l' re de la
Nouvelle &conomie et en cet <edge de d6clin>> de l'6tat
canadien.
En plus d'explorer l'impact de la Nouvelle &co-
nomie sur l'administration publique, l'auteur examine
comment les diffdrentes stratdgies prdconisdes pour sa
r6forme sont susceptibles d'interagir dans le contexte
de Ia Nouvelle lconomie. Traditionnellement, les trois
stratdgies principales propos6es pour Ia r6forme de
l'administration publique sont un contr6le judiciaire
accru de 'administration, une mise en valeur du pro-
fessionnalisme dans le service public et une plus
grande participation d6mocratique. L'auteur sugg~re
que ces strat6gies son ddsu~tes et peu susceptibles de
mener au succ~s dans le contexte de la Nouvelle &co-
nomie. Une quatri~me strat6gie, plus r6cente celle-lh,
est de rdinventer 'administration publique A la manire
d'un march6. L'auteur conclut que cette stratdgie de
<<mise en march& engendrera des changements radi-
caux dans notre faqon de concevoir le r6le du gouver-
nement et de l'administration publique.
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Introduction
In the youth of a state, arms do flourish; in the middle age
of a state, learning; and then both of them together for a
time; in the declining age of a state, mechanical arts and
merchandise.'
Bacon, it seems, was a better philosopher and public administrator than he was a
prophet. Canada is past the age of arms which helped to define our nationhood. We
appear to have put behind us the age of learning, which laid the foundations of our
modem economy and society in the post-war years. But alas, now that Canada edges
towards its "declining age", our economy - our "mechanical arts and merchandise"
- is not flourishing. Ironically, the Canadian state we have known since the war -
the welfare state - is declining precisely because the economy is not flourishing.
Without a vibrant economy, we cannot afford the state we deserve; and without a
healthy state, we will not have the essentials of the economy we need. The challenge
for Canada is to affirm what the harsh realities and heady slogans of the "New Econ-
omy" seem to deny: the need for a dynamic private sector working in tandem with a
benign and effective government. We once thought that we could count on a strong
public administration to meet that challenge. The ambition of this paper is to see
whether there is any likelihood that we ever can again.
From the inception of modem industrial society, and especially for the past sixty
years, governments in all industrialized democracies have been served by a large and
powerful administration, organized as some variant or other of Weberian bureauc-
racy.' For much of this period in most democratic countries, the leitmotif of conven-
tional political and economic debate was where to strike the balance of power be-
tween these public bureaucracies on the one hand, and private interests and market
forces on the other. In more recent iterations, however, while bureaucracy has re-
mained the central issue, the agenda of debate has shifted considerably. From the six-
ties onward, critics on the left began to ask which private interests actually did benefit
from the support of public administrators. Fears of regulatory capture and failures of
accountability and stewardship alienated various constituencies that had been aligned
with the activist state and the bureaucracies that were its agents. More recently, critics
on the right have begun to ask not simply whether we can cure bureaucracy, nor even
whether we can afford it, but whether indeed there is much need for public admini-
stration at all.
'Sir Francis Bacon, "Of Vicissitude of Things" (Essay LVIm, (U. 177-180) in M. Kiernan, ed., The
Essayes or Counsels, Civill and Morall (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985) 172 at 176 [modernized].
2 See M. Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, 1st American ed. by T. Parsons,
trans. A.M. Henderson & T. Parsons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947).
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Public law has likewise been preoccupied with bureaucracy, especially with the
allocation of power and responsibility within and amongst the administrative depart-
ments and agencies of the state, and as between the executive branch of government
and the legislative and judicial branches. Even the theory and practice of the modem
science of management in the private sector has been much influenced by the study of
public bureaucracies, the first large-scale, complex secular organizations.!
In short, bureaucracy - and public administration which is its paradigmatic form
- has been a site of contestation for control of some of the most important concepts
and institutions in our society. But these familiar institutions and concepts - demo-
cratic government and politics, public administration and public law, corporate man-
agement, bureaucracy itself- are constructs, shaped by time, place and circumstance.
They are not immutable. All are being reshaped by the advent of the New Economy.
The New Economy, itself a construct, is a compendious reference to three inter-
secting trends: startling developments in technology - especially information tech-
nology - and resulting changes in the social organization of work; liberalization of
the economies of most western democracies, accompanied by globalization of eco-
nomic activity and the growth of regional economic integration; and shifts in the
boundary between the state and civil society derived in part from the fiscal and eco-
nomic crises engendered by the first two phenomena but also from long-term changes
in political ideology, culture and institutions.
Sometimes practitioners of law and administration speak and act as if they believe
themselves to be the servants of autonomous systems, detached from the controlling
influence of the society, economy and polity that they ostensibly serve. Sometimes
they define their task as the subordination of these primordial forces to higher princi-
ples of justice, legality, propriety or efficiency (and indeed, we sometimes wish that
they would do so). But the New Economy challenges such beliefs, actions and task
definitions quite explicitly and brutally. Public administration and public law are not
likely to continue unchanged in a political economy in which traditional forms of
work organization are being revised, in which important actors - principally global
corporations - can evade domestic regimes of regulation, and in which growing
numbers of citizens are increasingly agnostic about the fundamental premise upon
which democratic public administration is built - the desirability, legitimacy, neces-
sity and efficacy of state intervention.
The two projects of this essay, then, are to explore the impact of the New Econ-
omy on public administration as we have known it, and to consider how various
strategies said to be appropriate for the reform of public administration - law, pro-
fessionalism, democracy and markets - are likely to play themselves out in the con-
text of the New Economy.
3 See ibicL; H. Fayol, General and Industrial Management, trans. C. Storrs (London: Pitman, 1949).
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I. The New Economy and Its Impact on Public Administration
The emerging socio-political and techno-economic paradigms that go by the
name of the New Economy obviously have different provenances and attempt to
capture different changes that have occurred at different rates of speed, and in differ-
ing degrees of extremity. Indeed, one of the important debates about the New Econ-
omy is whether the complex and contemporaneous changes it seeks to encapsulate in
a single terse phrase merely coincide or are causally related. Moreover, paradigms are
syntheses, recapitulations of the observations, diagnoses and predictions of different
observers whose contributions are shaped by their different intellectual and ideologi-
cal perspectives. It is the nature of the beast, as paradigms are always immanent, al-
ways emerging, that any snap-shot of the New Economy will fail to capture its unre-
solved contradictions and unrevealed consequences.
Thus, the New Economy cannot and should not be reified: it is only a heuristic
device, a shorthand, which evokes a number of diverse and complicated phenomena.
However, these phenomena are too palpable to be ignored. At the least, we have to
acknowledge that they have profoundly destabilized Canadian public administration,
and that we can usefully apply our minds to the task of "coping" with their collective
effects. "Coping" is a term which signals either resistance to, or facilitation of, these
forces. It therefore reminds us that public administration is contested terrain, whose
control is a valuable strategic asset sought by contending forces. As a consequence,
proposals for reform are not neutral: they express opposing views of what govern-
ment can do and should be doing.
A. Changes in Technology and the Social Organization of Work
While debate continues over the exact extent, consequences and significance of
the shift from fordist to post-fordist modes of production, it is clear that the social or-
ganization of work in all industrialized countries has been altered largely to the
benefit of employers and the prejudice of workers. The changes usually identified
with this shift include: the introduction of computer-driven technologies; the adoption
of flexible manufacturing and just-in-time supply strategies supported by corporate
alliances and networks of suppliers and subcontractors; a dramatic reduction in the
number of industrial workers and in the power of their unions; a corresponding rise in
employment in the service sector, especially in casual and non-standard employment
arrangements; the decline of traditional managerial hierarchies; the rise of a corporate
"technostructure" comprising experts and professionals; and the proliferation of small
consultancies. For present purposes, two important implications of these changes
must be identified.
First, they have largely eviscerated the paradigmatic assumptions underlying not
only our collective-labour laws, but many of the public policies that operated on
similar assumptions about the nature and character of our industrial economy, about
the workers, families and communities such an economy might be expected to sus-
tain, and about the social-welfare system needed to maintain the viability of a society
1997]
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organized around the fordist mode of production." The resulting disjunctures of policy
have caused great dislocation in public finance and program design, and as a result, in
public administration.
Second, the social organization of work in the public sector is itself undergoing
important changes similar to those observed in the private sector. Indeed, one of the
most striking changes is the increasing use by public-sector managers of private-
sector rhetoric, analytical tools and employment strategies Such changes are moti-
vated, no doubt, by efficiency concerns, but also by a wish to be aligned with the
dominant anti-state tendency in political discourse.
The affinities between private- and public-sector developments are considerable.
State fiscal crises are made to stand proxy for global competition, as justification for
hiring and wage freezes, redundancies and rollbacks. Privatization of government
functions is treated as analogous to corporate divestiture of unprofitable subsidiaries,
in order to achieve a clear focus on activities deemed central to its primary
"business"; this is a self-justifying argument for reducing the scope of government
activity and the size of the government workforce without actually having to assess
the social consequences. Emulating the "make-or-buy" decisions of private firms,
governments are "out-sourcing" many functions. The result is the creation of hybrid
agencies and networks involving horizontal and vertical links among government
agencies and with private firms, relationships known in the private sector as "strategic
alliances". The reduction of government research capability, coupled with the demand
for more accountability for internal programs and the need for more monitoring of
privatized functions, is spurring the growth of numerous consultancies - often em-
ploying former civil servants - which in effect serve as "just-in-time contractors" for
government. The flattening of public-service management structures to produce "lean
organizations" is eliminating familiar career paths. And so on.
All of these developments - legitimated by anti-state rhetoric and facilitated by
changes in technology and the organization of private-sector work - have demoral-
ized public employees and made them extremely insecure. In due course, demoraliza-
tion and insecurity affect recruitment, retention and job performance, at which point
well-rehearsed disparagements of bureaucracy and civil servants become self-
fulfilling prophecies.
Further, apart from transforming the social organization of work in the public
service, technology has also had some powerful transformative effects on the state's
4 For a more extended account of this phenomenon, see H.W. Arthurs, "Labour Law Without the
State?" (1996) 46 U.T.L.J. 1.
'See e.g. D. Cameron, "The Discipline and the Profession of Public Administration: An Aca-
demic's Perspective" (1982) 25 Can. Pub. Admin. 496; H.L. LaFramboise, "The Future of Public
Administration in Canada" (1982) 25 Can. Pub. Admin. 507; D. Savoie, "Studying Public Admini-
stration" (1990) 33 Can. Pub. Admin. 389. See also K. Kernaghan, "Reshaping Government: The
Post-Bureaucratic Paradigm" (1993) 36 Can. Pub. Admin. 636, which reviews a number of influential
American contributions and cites as meriting "special attention" D. Osborne & T. Gaebler, Reinvent-
ing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector (Reading, Mass.:
Addison-Wesley, 1992).
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capacity for social control. In some respects, technology has enhanced government's
powers. For the first time, democratic governments find themselves with the technical
capacity to maintain close surveillance not only of citizens implicated in criminal or
anti-social behaviour, but of virtually everyone. This has forced a whole series of is-
sues onto the agenda of public administration - the protection of confidential data
banks, the creation of registers of individuals at risk from contagious or degenerative
diseases, the use of electronic bracelets to monitor paroled offenders, the surveillance
of highways with photo radar to detect speeders.
In other respects, however, technology has imposed new limits on government's
regulatory powers. Innovations in telecommunications technology have rendered
governments virtually incapable of controlling commercial and cultural activities
traditionally within the state's natural sphere of influence. Rail and air transportation
and postal services, once considered quintessential public enterprises and policy in-
struments, must now compete with private-sector alternatives offering identical or
substitute services. Photocopiers, fax machines and electronic mail have made it so
easy for private parties to disseminate or exchange funds, secrets, smut and hate
propaganda that it is hard to see how government can ever reassert even minimally ef-
fective control. These developments, it seems, open up new chapters in the centuries-
old debate over whether the state's regulatory reach can, should or does exceed its
technological grasp.
Finally, technology not only shapes public employment, provides tools for regula-
tors and defines the practical limits of government control, it is also a regulatory sys-
tem. Technology demands a certain kind of behaviour from those who design, pro-
duce and use it. For example, the need to ensure that computers, television and tele-
phones can interact requires that certain technical standards be internationally-agreed;
these agreed standards, in effect, then function as a form of legislation. Technology
users, such as air-traffic controllers or tax examiners, must possess certain competen-
cies, follow standard procedures and function with no more or less discretion than is
compatible with the demands and possibilities of the technology itself. Hence tech-
nology, by determining the way in which public servants perform their jobs, also op-
erates normatively to establish, in effect, standards of airline safety and the limits of
tolerance for tax evasion.
In each of these examples, private decisions about the design or adoption of tech-
nology shape public policies. This, to be sure, is not a new phenomenon. Almost from
the beginning of the industrial revolution, governments frustrated by their inability to
define and enforce specific safety standards for workers and consumers were some-
times able to achieve their regulatory objectives by persuading or coercing technol-
ogy-based industries, such as mines, railways and shipping lines, to engineer en-
hanced safety features into their machines and vehicles." This continuing symbiosis
between state regulation and the normative character of privately developed tech-
nologies is evident today in efforts by government to negotiate the adoption of higher
61 have traced this development in H.W. Arthurs, "Without the Law": Administrative Justice and
Legal Pluralism in Nineteenth-Century England (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985).
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automobile emissions standards and the development of safer aeroplane landing sys-
tems. Ultimately, then, acknowledgment that technology has normative effects leads
us back to difficult questions: why technology is designed in a particular way;
whether its social consequences are planned or unforeseen; whose interests are served
- whether by design or happenstance - by its introduction. Profoundly important
questions these, but for another occasion.
B. Globalization and Regional Economic Integration
Globalization has a private perspective and a public perspective. In the private
perspective, globalization occurs as corporations reach across national borders to or-
ganize production and distribution, investors participate in international markets, and
transnational institutions such as banks, brokers and law firms facilitate such activi-
ties. But this private perspective ultimately resides within the public perspective of
globalization. For all of these activities to occur, states must abandon the familiar
regulatory regimes of the post-war period, with which they protected their national
economic space, in favour of domestic policies and international treaty commitments
designed to liberalize trade. In so doing, states commit themselves not just to the free
movement across national borders of goods, services and capital, but also to the in-
creasing integration of their national economies and polities into larger systems, re-
gional or global.
However, globalization can also be seen in quite different perspectives - the il-
licit traffic in drugs, guns and dirty money, the movement of immigrants and refugees,
the ubiquitous preoccupation with "world-wide" news, entertainment, fashion and
sport, or the emerging international human-rights and environmental movements -
all of which both depend upon and challenge the capacity of states to define and pro-
tect national interests.
Even the most ardent supporters of globalization and free trade are not content to
leave business activity entirely unregulated, either at home or abroad: trade marks
must be protected, fraud must be punished, contracts must be enforced. Even the most
highly principled humanitarians accept that movements of refugees and immigrants
must be subject to some controls. And even the most cynical of governments - what-
ever their actual behaviour - will seldom confess to supporting the drug trade, terror-
ism or money laundering. However, since the ability of individual states to regulate
international movements of all kinds has diminished, they have perforce begun to ex-
periment with structures which might facilitate regulation and social control across
national boundaries. Such arrangements include closer coordination and cooperation
amongst national agencies concerned with fraud (Interpol), treaties or conventions
whose signatory states agree to enact or enforce labour or environmental laws that
meet specified standards (I.L.O., N.A.F.T.A. side-accords), the creation of regional
trade blocs with regulatory powers (the E.U.), and regimes that define the terms of
global trade (G.A.T.T.W.T.O.) or migration (the International Convention on Refu-
gees). This globalization of the regulation not only of economic activity, but of crime
and migration as well, considerably alters the dynamic of Canadian public admini-
stration.
[Vol. 42
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Canada, compared to most countries, is unusually dependent on international
trade. However, given the relatively small size of our economy, we are seldom able to
influence the substantive policies of international regimes - the World Bank, the In-
ternational Copyright Convention - in the way in which the United States and the
other G7 nations are able to do.7 Moreover, firms based in those very nations domi-
nate many sectors of Canada's domestic economy, so that we cannot count on help
from influential corporations which might align themselves with Canada's national
interests. We therefore suffer from a diminished national capacity and will to resist or
modify uncongenial international regimes. This diminished capacity is further con-
strained by other well-known Canadian problems. This is a world in which economic
power derives in large measure from knowledge and capital. However, we are a net
importer of intangibles: intellectual property, capital, technology, sophisticated legal
and managerial concepts, high and popular culture and - for better or worse - even
political ideologies and strategies. And this is a world in which social cohesion
grounds at least some successful versions of capitalism! However, social inequality
has been growing rather than diminishing in Canada, and regional disparities have left
in their wake palpable inequities, resentments and trade barriers which stand in the
way of concerted national action. Indeed, with the Quebec question - and therefore
decentralization - high on the agenda for the foreseeable future, we may well be un-
able to generate national consensus in any form, whether social democratic or neo-
conservative. This certainly does not mean we count for nothing in the international
sphere, or that we are utterly incapable of formulating domestic policy. But, more
than many countries, our capacity to define and pursue our own interests in the global
economy is limited by the peculiar conjuncture of our domestic political crises.
All of these factors produce a further consequence: we are not only vulnerable to
pressure from both foreign governments and foreign investors, we are acutely sensi-
tive about our own vulnerability. Fluctuations in the Canadian dollar and in the mar-
ket for Canadian bonds and securities, complaints (often spurious) about our "unfair"
trade practices, threats by multinationals to close Canadian plants or offers to expand
them: such concerns cast their long shadow over virtually all aspects of public-policy
formation, from taxation to labour relations to environmental policy to Quebec's in-
dependence. Thus, we make policy timidly, not merely because of possible domestic
economic or political repercussions, not merely to avoid violating our treaty obliga-
tions, but because we do not wish to offend foreign investors or disquiet global mar-
kets.9
7 This is not to deny that Canada has made an important contribution in other areas, such as the en-
vironment, refugees and the law of the sea.
8 See e.g. R.D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work Civic Traditions in Modem Italy (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1993); W. Hutton, The State We're In (London: Jonathan Cape, 1995) at
257-84.
9 See e.g. the proposal by Michael Wilson, former Conservative finance minister, that all federal
budgets should be proposed, as it were, in draft, so that markets can respond and appropriate correc-
tions can be made in the final version (M. Wilson, "Wanted: A More Open, Useful Way to Deliver
Canada's Budget" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (22 May 1995) All.
1997]
MCGILL LAW JOURNAL/REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL
Furthermore, our subordinate position is neither solely the result of timidity nor
likely to vanish if we resolve our political crises and regain our confidence. We have
institutionalized our weakness by acceding to N.A.FT.A. and committing ourselves,
virtually in perpetuity, to free trade and all its consequences. This is not to deny that
positive benefits may flow to Canada as a result of our trade relationship with the
United States, but they do so because we have in effect agreed to integrate ourselves
into the world's largest economy and predominant political and cultural power. In this
sense, N.A.ET.A. is more than a treaty guaranteeing free trade; it functions also as a
"conditioning framework"," which generates pressures for us to comport ourselves in
many respects as if we were integrated culturally, socially and politically, as well as
economically. Thus, the long-term consequences of N.A.F.T.A. are as much psycho-
logical as they are juridical and economic.
How will all this affect public administration? In accepting formal harmonization
of our law under various international conventions and treaties, including N.A.FT.A.,
we are actually subordinating ourselves to legal regimes shaped by the template of
American law. But even without N.A.FT.A. we might have found ourselves in a
similar situation. Canada's corporate culture is so overwhelmingly of American (and
other foreign) provenance, that we have been hard-pressed to create a management
style consistent with our own socio-political circumstances. Popular culture - includ-
ing attitudes towards government - is so profoundly influenced by American televi-
sion that we run the risk of abandoning our modest and peculiar traditions of collec-
tivism. And because of long-standing academic and professional affinities, we have
borrowed from the United States much of our social and economic theory, our admin-
istrative technology and conceptual discourse of regulation. In consequence, we may
have created an inadvertent predisposition to policies which do not always accord
with our own values, conventions or interests."
How did all this come about? In part, to be sure, we had no choice. As a small
country, we were obliged to trade on the basis of whatever procedural, juridical and
institutional arrangements were on offer, arrangements that naturally favoured more
powerful trading nations. In part, however, we readily acceded to this new interna-
tional regime, dominated by the United States, because of the tendency of important
Canadian communities - labour, management, consumers, professions, political par-
ties, government and universities - to look abroad for expertise, inspiration and vali-
dation.
By way of example, consider the consequences of globalization for the relation-
ship between state regulation and corporate management. So long as we operated on
the post-war premise that national economies would be managed nationally on
Keynesian principles, and coordinated internationally under the Bretton Woods re-
" See R. Grinspun & R Kreklewich, "Consolidating Neoliberal Reforms: 'Free Trade' as a Condi-
tioning Framework" (1994) 43 Stud. Pol. Econ. 33.
" I have explored this theme in "Labour Law without the State?", supra note 4. Securities, food and
drugs, industrial property, rail and air transport, occupational health and safety and rate regulation are
other areas where our regulatory strategies have been borrowed from other countries, albeit often with
local adaptations.
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gime, foreign firms wishing to do business in Canada found it expedient to establish
subsidiaries in this country. Moreover, communications, marketing and financial re-
quirements often reinforced the decision to establish local subsidiaries, rather than to
operate from a foreign base. Managers and directors of these subsidiaries naturally
owed their ultimate loyalty to their multinational employer. However, their manage-
rial styles and strategies were somewhat influenced by the fact that they lived and
worked in Canada. At a minimum, the fact that they had to deal on a daily basis with
Canadian regulators, media, unions and consumers sensitized them to some degree to
Canadian life and law. This sensitivity often enabled or induced them to influence
decisions of the parent firm in favour of maintaining or expanding Canadian opera-
tions, which would naturally enhance their own personal interests as well.
Yet, this picture is changing rapidly. As a result of rapid advances in telecommu-
nications and information systems, the head offices of many global corporations can
now perform functions - production and inventory controls, financial accounting,
sales analysis - that had previously to be performed locally. Advertising can now be
generated in the United States and aimed directly at Canadian consumers from the
United States. Under N.A.ET.A. and the G.A.T.T., more and more goods and services
can be supplied to Canadians directly from American plants rather than from Cana-
dian branch plants with small, uneconomic runs of a large variety of products. Indeed,
as economic integration proceeds apace under N.A.ET.A., the very concept of a sepa-
rate Canadian market becomes dubious. In the face of all these developments, the
logic of having Canadian subsidiaries is rapidly evaporating. Consequently, many
foreign-based firms appear to be reducing the status and authority of their Canadian
managers and corporate boards, if not eliminating them entirely. Some, of course, are
not only reducing their corporate presence in Canada; they are suspending production
here altogether.
The diminished corporate presence of multinationals in Canada has potential re-
percussions for public administration. Much regulation becomes effective through
moral suasion and, as noted, the socialization of corporate decision-makers. If corpo-
rate representatives are no longer present in Canada to be suased or socialized, gov-
ernments will have to fall back on more formal techniques of enforcement, which are
often slow, costly and undependable. Worse yet: to the extent that regulation does de-
pend upon the state's use, or threatened use, of its coercive powers, we are left with
diminished capacity to coerce. Companies that serve the Canadian market from
abroad, as part of a larger North American market, are essentially beyond the reach of
Canadian law. And multinationals that retain a base in Canada can face down the state
by making increasingly credible threats to reduce their Canadian operations, or even
to leave Canada altogether.
It can fairly be said that we are witnessing only the intensification of previous
patterns of corporate conduct. However, this intensification confronts public adminis-
trators more frequently and more forcibly with a painful dilemma: to regulate firmly,
or to tread soffly in order to advance the "higher" national interest of maintaining Ca-
nadian industrial production and jobs. As we will see next, what is presented as a di-
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lemma for individual public administrators is also a profound issue for the Canadian
state as a whole.
C. Shifting the Boundaries between State and Civil Society:
The Ideology of the New Economy
In the liturgy of the New Economy, few hymns are so popular as the Nunc Dimit-
tis, sung whenever the state appears in its interventionist role. The chorus joins many
different voices in celebration of the retrenchment of the state: neo-conservative
ideologues who believe in the market, liberals committed to individual rights and
fearful of domineering government, finance ministers who are sympathetic "in prin-
ciple" to state action but cannot work out how to pay for it, aggressive entrepreneurs
for whom state action represents only an unwanted cost of doing business, populists
- fulminating over la trahison des clercs - who want to lobotomize government,
opportunist bureaucrats who are prepared to curry favour by disavowing all forms of
state action (including the one they manage), and even social reformers who are
coming to believe that decades of activist government have - to their frustration and
regret - clearly failed to bring us any nearer the New Jerusalem. All of these voices,
yet the result is a chorus, not a cacophony.
Of course the state still has its uses. The state alone can sign international treaties
(which oblige it to abstain from acting like a state). It will retain its functions as
nightwatchman (pending further experimentation with security firms and privatized
prisons). It will continue to provide education (or education vouchers), welfare (or
workfare) and health care (of a minimal sort, for those who cannot afford to buy pri-
vate insurance). And it will defend society against illegal immigrants and drug dealers
(a task made easier by the tendency to conflate the two categories), disruptive abo-
riginals (possibly by subcontracting to First Nations the power to subdue their own)
and disaffected members of the working- and under-classes (many of whom, disaf-
fection notwithstanding, vote for reductions in social welfare and increases in polic-
ing). If this indeed is to be the future of the Canadian state, who would wish - who
would presume - to undertake its administration, and to what end?
The ambitions and strategies of the interventionist state have long been shaped,
and its tools sharpened, by an uneasy alliance of moral entrepreneurs, intellectuals
and civil-service technocrats.'2 Of course, this alliance had no autonomous powers of
enactment; conventions of parliamentary government and traditions of professional-
ism made civil servants responsible to elected ministers for the execution of policies
adopted by the legislature. However, since most governments during the post-war
years were committed to some extent to an interventionist state, they tended to work
comfortably with the civil service and other groups concerned with the same objec-
tives.
'2See S.E. Finer, The Life and imes of Sir Edwin Chadwick (London: Methuen, 1952); 0. Mac-
Donagh, Early Victorian Government 1830-1870 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1977); D. Rob-
erts, Victorian Origins of the British Welfare State (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1960).
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This does not imply that the public service and the government always saw eye to
eye. Wartime bureaucracies had to squeeze down to adjust to post-war "normality".
Periods of growth in government's powers and staff alternated with periods of re-
straint. But only in the 1970s did governments begin serious retrenchment of their ac-
tivities and personnel, and only in the 1980s was retrenchment accompanied by ag-
gressive measures to limit the power of public-sector unions to resist it.'" Now, in the
1990s, we are experiencing not merely cyclical qualms about state intervention, not
merely modest rollbacks of public-service wages and staff complements, not merely
modernization and reconfiguration of government, but a successful attack on the very
idea both of interventionist government and of the need for committed public servants
as its agents. The result is that, almost for the first time, governments are requiring
that the public service participate in its own systematic denigration. Whether this is a
"commonsense" revolution or not, it clearly presages a revolution of some sort in Ca-
nadian public administration.
For this revolution to be successful, the first prerequisites were the articulation of
an ideology, a concrete program expressing that ideology, and public acceptance of
that program (signalled by the arrival in office of political parties committed to it).
Self-declared neo-conservative governments have come to power in Alberta and On-
tario (two of our three richest provinces), but even Quebec and Saskatchewan, with
nominally social-democratic governments, have followed a somewhat similar line.
Without denying that degrees of brutality and gleefulness distinguish these two
groups of governments, to paraphrase an old saw, it seems that "we are all fiscal con-
servatives now". In any event, winning elections is a necessary, not a sufficient,
condition for the dismantling of the interventionist state. Given that the fundamental
justification for anti-government governments holding power is that they wish to
abandon its use, it is ironic that they must first find a way to concentrate internal
authority." Somehow, these governments must bind the hands of all of their members
to prevent them from being wrung after an unplanned but disconcerting encounter
with those of another persuasion. The prime minister must be able to control the en-
tire direction of government; the finance minister must be able to control expenditures
(but not necessarily policies) in line departments and transfer agencies; and "wet"
members of cabinet or caucus must be made to maintain discipline.
Also required are a number of changes in the culture, conventions and law of
administration. First, within the public service, leadership must pass from those who
believe in the state to those who do not. This can be accomplished by more effectively
subordinating the civil service to the political apparatus of the governing party, and by
politicizing the civil service to ensure that the "right" people emerge in key positions.
Second, where activism cannot be harnessed to the new agenda, it has to be discour-
aged. This can be accomplished either in a positive way, by expanding the numbers
and influence within the civil service of economists, business school graduates and
" See L. Panitch & D. Swartz, The Assault on Trade Union Freedoms: From Wage Controls to So-
cial Contract, rev. ed. (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1993); D. Drache & H. Glasbeek, The Changing
Workplace: Reshaping Canada's Industrial Relations System (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1992).
,4 See Hutton, supra note 8.
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others who are by training and background instinctively uncongenial to intervention-
ist government, or negatively, by creating a "chilly climate" for public servants who
cannot be weaned from their old commitment to non-partisan activism. Third, it is
important to prevent any internal critique of planned reductions in government activ-
ity and spending. This can be accomplished by re-socialization of the public service
through reduced consultation between the civil service and "client" groups seeking to
preserve the former interventionist policies, and through increased consultation with
groups hostile to the state. In addition, the risk of internal critique can be reduced by
eliminating advisory bodies, research units or other centres of analytical capacity
within government which might be the source of informed agnosticism about pro-
posed initiatives. Fourth, ministries must be weaned from their attachment to their
historic missions, and tutored, coerced and enticed into a posture of self-abnegation.
This is accomplished not just by reducing program budgets but by establishing per-
formance measures, accountability centres and stakhanovite reward systems for
achieving reductions in expenditure and increases in "efficiency". And fifth, since
government employees themselves are directly affected by reductions in government
expenditures, programs and powers, it is necessary to forestall any concerted resis-
tance by them, by undermining their solidarity and confidence through a program of
dismissals, wage reductions and the constriction of public-sector collective-bargaining
rights.
To be sure, some such strategies would have to be undertaken in order to effect
any fundamental change in the role of government, whether that change was in the di-
rection of more activism or less. Some, for example, were used by the N.D.P. gov-
ernment of Ontario that was overthrown by the Conservative "commonsense revolu-
tion". However, such assaults on the public service - and, by extension, on its moral
and intellectual allies - are likely to become more extreme and debilitating as the
neo-conservative agenda takes hold, precisely because that agenda fundamentally
challenges not just the job security of the public service, but also its world view and
professional self-image. When this transformation is linked to changes in the institu-
tional structures of Canadian government, the results are likely to be more far-
reaching yet.
Canada is experiencing an acute and extended attack of "centrophobia". We seem
determined to accomplish the wholesale devolution of financial, administrative and
legislative powers from the federal government to the provinces, statelets and largish
townships that (at least for now) constitute the Canadian federation. There they will
be sequestered under political, constitutional and Charter? constraints, so that the na-
tional government will never again be able to assert itself as promoter of the common
good or bulwark against foreign and domestic aggregations of private interest. 6 De-
" Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B
to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter Charter].
,61 am not embarrassed to acknowledge the influence of the eponymous Frank Scott - in whose
honour this paper was originally given- on my unfashionable and intemperate views. See E.R. Scott,
"Federal Jurisdiction over Labour Relations - A New Look" (1960) 6 McGill L.J. 153; .R. Scott,
"Canadian Federalism: the Legal Perspective" (1967) 5 Albany L. Rev. 263.
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mands for devolution from all parts of the country, and across the political spectrum,
are not new: after all, centrifugal forces have been in play almost since the beginning
of the Canadian federation, often said to be one of the most decentralized in the
world. However, there is something a little odd about the current situation.
Previous versions of the devolution debate were about allocating the authority
and credit, the responsibilities and burdens, of the interventionist state. By contrast,
the debate today is not about which programs should be funded and delivered by what
level of government, but about who should be blamed - or praised - for their de-
mise. The debate is no longer whether the provinces should be encouraged to function
as social laboratories but whether some provinces will be able to afford any social ex-
periments at all. The debate, therefore, is not whether Canadian citizens should be
able to move freely across the country, and to receive a reasonable level of service
and protection wherever they are, but whether national standards should be aban-
doned as an intolerable interference with the democratic right of provincial govern-
ments to dismantle the interventionist state in the manner of their own choosing. And
finally, the debate is certainly not whether, in the populist vernacular, government
closer to the people will be more efficient and responsive, but whether we may be
initiating a regulatory "race to the bottom", comparable to what some identify as the
likely by-product of globalization. 7
Today's debate over devolution is quite different in another respect. It implicates,
of course, many of the traditional questions of identity and alienation which are en-
demic in Canadian constitutional and political discourse. But in the current context,
these questions cut to the core of Canada's continued viability as a nation. Quebec,
the West and First Nations have very different historical and juridical claims, but they
are all incompatible with the continued existence of a strong federal government. For
the past half-century, their claims might have been countered by the argument that the
federal government was the custodian of Canada's social-welfare system, of many
regulatory safeguards and of essential elements of public infrastructure. Now that
those federal functions are being devolved, privatized or abandoned altogether, the
case in favour of a radically decentralized federation seems unanswerable.
Unanswerable, that is, so long as we are committed to a minimalist state: after all,
it hardly matters which government is not a presence, so long as none of them is. But
if the pendulum should swing, if we should again become enamoured of the interven-
tionist state and again convince ourselves that we can afford it, what will happen
then? Multiple regimes of welfare, medical care, securities regulation and labour-
market adjustment may increase cost, reduce efficiency and, in many cases, foster in-
equity and complexify interprovincial mobility. Global competition and new patterns
of trade and manufacturing require careful attention to the concertation of public
policies and private initiatives, to the enhancement of civic infrastructure and to the
strategic deployment of government's few remaining fiscal, monetary and economic
" See e.g. R. Janda, "Reviving Federalism: Canadian Reflections on an American Dream" (1994)
19 Yale J. Int'l L. 207; B. Langille, "Canadian Labour Law Reform and Free Trade" (1991) 23 Ot-
tawa L. Rev. 581.
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powers. These are all reasons, in general, why the federal government became the
dominant actor in the first place. But if we were to create constitutional structures
whose effect might be to prevent the re-emergence of national standards and pro-
grams, we would in effect have built inefficiency and inequity into the structure of
such programs, thereby reducing the likelihood of ever reintroducing them, even at
the local level. And if we abandon what remains of national power to tax, spend,
regulate and co-ordinate, we will never again be able to take positive steps to improve
our economic fortunes and pay for social programs.
Thus, we are confronted with an unattractive choice. If we ignore demands for
radical devolution - radical because they are expressed as de jure, not simply de
facto, demands - we run the risk of having no country at all. But if we accede to
them, we run the risk of having constitutionalized a neo-conservative vision of the
passive state. In this sense, then, the federal question becomes intertwined with the
equally fundamental question of the Canadian state's future role in economic and so-
cial life.
Nor is devolution the only constitutional issue that casts a long shadow. We must
also consider the effect of the Charter on the juridification of politics and public ad-
ministration. The Charter acknowledges that the Canadian state is founded upon
principles which include adherence to the rule of law" in the legislative and executive,
if not the judicial," branch of government. In Dicey's classic exposition, the rule of
law is a strategy both for frustrating the rise of the interventionist state and for hob-
bling its characteristic institutional forms, ministries and administrative agencies.2 In
this sense, the Charter neither initiated nor much intensified the judiciary's he-
gemonic claims over the administration. These had become amply evident, for ex-
ample, in the courts' inflation of section 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867," as well as
in the everyday practice of judicial review.' However, the Charter has helped to
transform Canadian law and legal culture in five important respects which have pro-
found effects for public administration.
Previously, requirements of procedural fairness in administration were treated as
implicit, subject to specific legislative indications of what procedures were mandated;
with the enactment of the Charter, procedural fairness became an explicit requirement
in many fields of administrative law, especially those involving deprivations of per-
sonal liberty, such as refugee and immigration claims and prison discipline. Previ-
ously, legislatures were accorded broad latitude in constructing regulatory regimes;
with the enactment of the Charter, legislative policies had to pass the tests of over-
"' See Charter, supra note 15, preamble.
9 See R.WD.S.U. v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573,33 D.L.R. (4th) 174.
20 See A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 10th ed. (London:
Macmillan, 1965); see also H.W. Arthurs, "Rethinking Administrative Law: A Slightly Dicey Busi-
ness" (1979) 17 Osgoode Hall LJ. 1.
2' Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3.
22See H.W. Arthurs, "Protection against Judicial Review" (1983) 43 R. du B. 277.
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breadth and proportionality, and as we have recently seen, had to demonstrate that
they had done so with convincing evidence."
Hence a third consequence of the Charter it adds considerably to the transaction
costs of constructing and administering any administrative regime. Those seeking to
forestall regulation or escape its reach can now use Charter litigation either in terro-
rem (as an argument against new legislation or regulations) or after the fact, in order
to obstruct and delay, if not to fatally wound, administrative agencies pursuing public
policies. The resulting administrative structures are more cumbersome and costly, less
supple and proactive. The presence of lawyers becomes inevitable; litigation is a con-
stant threat; and the prospect of being declared unconstitutional lends an air of contin-
gency to all regulatory initiatives. And thus a fourth consequence. By both precept
and example, the Charter teaches that the particular late-twentieth-century cultural
artifact we happen to know as law - rights, legislation, courts, adjudication, lawyers
- is not only inevitable but the very hallmark of a democratic society. This teaching
blinds us to the positive potential of other social visions and values, other institutional
forms and processes.
Ultimately, however, the Charter's greatest effect is not so much direct as indi-
rect. It has helped to reshape the consciousness of Canadians, and thereby to reinforce
the power of the New Economy paradigm. The Charter has legitimated - and ar-
guably even launched - the growing tendency to see ourselves as rights-bearing in-
dividuals rather than as members of a community, as operating at odds with the state
rather than as its beneficiaries, as seekers of personal redress through litigation rather
than as agents of social improvement through political activity. These perceptions, for
obvious reasons, are very pertinent to the ways in which we relate to the state and its
administration.
The ideology of the New Economy, then, is not merely - perhaps not primarily
- a belief in the virtue of markets. Changing attitudes towards individualism, com-
munities, nations, states, politics, public institutions, law and civic participation have
converged around a central conviction that the boundaries between the state and civil
society should be redrawn - the realm of private action expanded, and the role of
government reduced. This conviction, however, is shot through with ironies. First, the
boundaries between state and civil society have always been shifting and permeable;
the state has never had a total monopoly on legitimacy or coercion; it could never
count on having its way with the market or with local communities; it has always
shared with private institutions its putative authority over regulation and social con-
trol.' Second, in the early running at least, civil society - newly revivified - is dem-
onstrating only a limited inclination and capacity to address the complex and urgent
problems of our times; we may soon find ourselves reinventing the state. And third,
those who move and shake the New Economy do not have a monopoly on disdain for
2 SeeR.J.R.-MacDonaldlnc. v. Canada (A.G.), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199, 127 D.L.R. (4th) 1.
24This, of course, has been the great insight of legal pluralist scholarship. See e.g. S.E. Merry,
"Legal Pluralism" (1988) 22 Law & Soc'y Rev. 869 at 890: "The dialectical analysis of relations
among normative orders provides a framework for understanding the dynamics of the imposition of
law and of resistance to law ..."
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government and public administration. As the next section of this essay suggests, they
are joined by many who are nominally committed to the idea of an interventionist
state. But three ironies do not a paradigm confute. The new anti-state ideological con-
sensus has important, and possibly transformative, implications for public admini-
stration.
II. The New Economy and Its Administration: Law, Professionalism,
Democracy and Markets
In that innocent, far-off time - until, say, the 1990s - when resuscitation of the
activist state remained a project with some plausibility, three main strategies were
proposed for the reform of public administration: increased external accountability
through legal controls; internal accountability through enhanced professionalism; and
greater democratic participation. None of these was ever particularly promising, but
in the event all have now acquired a faint whiff of anachronism. More recently, in the
heyday of the New Economy, another strategy has come into prominence, the
"reinvention" of public administration as its own antithesis - a market. This strategy,
by contrast, is promising indeed, but what it promises may not be to everyone's lik-
ing.
A. Increased Legal Control of the Administration
Virtually since the beginning of the activist state in Victorian England, public
administration has been confronted with two very different visions of law. One sees
law as a "bridle for leviathan", a device to hold the administration accountable and
protect citizens' rights; the other sees law as a set of norms arising within the admini-
stration - as in any site of complex social interaction - in order to organize and fa-
cilitate the performance of complex tasks. These two visions have generally been as-
sociated with opposing political ideologies. Legal accountability - "the rule of law"
- has usually served the cause of those who wished to frustrate state intervention; the
notion of an indigenous and largely autonomous law of the administration has been
favoured by those who want democratic governments to be able to get on with their
work without constraints imposed by unelected judges at the behest of wealthy and
powerful private interests.
In the New Economy, however, while "law" in both senses continues to have sali-
ence for public administration, their magnetic fields seem to be reversing; what for-
merly attracted one now appeals to the other. As we will see, leviathan's bridle is now
being tentatively examined for its potential to urge the beast of state forward, rather
than restrain it; and there are clear signs that the indigenous law of public administra-
tion may be used to make activist governments quiescent. In short, in the New Econ-
omy, law and public administration are implicated in the same conflicts, and suffer
from the same debilities. The one is therefore a most unlikely cure for the other.
' I have explored this notion elsewhere: see Arthurs, supra note 6.
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True, law may still be called upon to lend permanence, coherence and discipline
to the New Economy. Formal legal arrangements may be adopted in order to perma-
nently disable government from recovering its capacity to regulate. For example, in-
ternational treaties and conventions often require governments to foreswear interven-
tion in their own economies as an illicit encumbrance on free trade,'6 and to
"harmonize" their own domestic law with so-called transnational norms, in order to
facilitate regional or global economic integration, thus requiring them to abandon
policies designed to protect domestic industries or institutions 7 Constitutions may be
amended or interpreted to devolve responsibilities to lower levels of government that
do not have the means to discharge them, to strictly limit state spending on welfare or
to force regulation into procedural and institutional forms that increase its costs and
reduce its efficacy. Charters of rights and malleable doctrines of judicial review may
arm powerful private interests with the means of challenging government action and
tempt individual citizens to pursue their concerns through the courts, rather than
through the political process or regulatory and administrative regimes. And domestic
legislation that establishes regulatory regimes and welfare entitlements may be re-
pealed or retrenched.
In all of these respects, law is being used as an external force to limit state action
and redefine the mandate and modus operandi of public administration. In this sense,
the New Economy can be said to be embedded in a foundation of law and a culture of
legalism.
However, many signs and portents point the other way. The New Economy is in-
deed generating prolific normative changes, but many of these are not expressed in
formal law, such as treaties, constitutions, statutes or judge-made doctrine. Rather,
much of the normative transformation of the state is emerging from the interstices of
public administration in the form of executive orders, management directives, organ-
izational arrangements, low visibility decisions, patterns of behaviour, and a shifting
consensus about the ends to be achieved by the exercise of discretion. There are two
reasons for this phenomenon.
The first is that external law is not self-executing. Law educates; it intimidates;
sometimes it even inspires. But in the end, when used to control or transform public
administration, it requires the agency of judges. Here is the Achilles' heel of law: in
John Willis's often repeated aphorism, judges are civil servants in the department of
dispute resolution. Courts themselves are bureaucracies of a particular kind, and as it
happens they are neither an efficient nor an effective bureaucracy.' In consequence,
they are a problem rather than a solution for those who want to use law to reshape
public administration.
26 See Grinspun & Kreklewich, supra note 10.
27 See e.g. J. Horton, "Pharmaceuticals, Patents, and Bill C-91: The Historical Perspective" (1993)
10 Can. Intell. Prop. Rev. 145.
2 See M.L. Friedland, A Place Apart: Judicial Independence and Accountability in Canada
(Ottawa: Canada Communication Group, 1995).
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This problem is in fact likely to receive attention in the New Economy, as part of
a general concern to make government more efficient. The justice system is notori-
ously slow, expensive and inaccessible. Attempting to respond to these concerns,
many courts have experimented with case management and pretrial conferences, and
with alternative dispute resolution (A.D.R.) techniques which will enable them to dis-
pose of disputes more cheaply, rapidly and conveniently than they would be able to
do through formal adjudication. These strategies, of course, are borrowed from other
public bureaucracies. However, the courts are not just any other bureaucracy. As ex-
emplars of constitutional propriety and legal rectitude, they must not only be efficient;
they must at the same time make good on their well-advertised commitment to pro-
vide citizens with access to the highest quality of justice in their conflicts with each
other and the state.
Since courts will not be given additional resources, and since their own traditions
preclude radical changes in management or procedures, they will have few options
save to ration access to formal adjudication. By reserving this precious resource for
the most deserving and needful, they would be acting in a manner consistent with the
general approach of public administration in the New Economy. Thus, prospective
litigants are likely to be subjected to a form of triage. Those with "important" claims
- constitutional rights, significant business or institutional interests, personal liberty
- will be given access as of right to curial adjudication; an intermediate category of
claimants - those involved in property or consumer or family disputes - may be of-
fered access to adjudication, although in fact discouraged from actually litigating by
user fees and other deterrents; and high volume, low significance claims - "minor"
or "routine" claims for social benefits, regulatory protection, immigration - will if
possible be disposed of non-adjudicatively. Non-adjudicative disposition, to be effi-
cient, must become increasingly impersonal. It will therefore take the form of stan-
dardized responses dispensed by computers or clerks, while the routinization of mass
justice will be concealed by initiatives to "empower" citizens by providing them with
information about their rights and entitlements via pamphlets, voice-response systems
and home pages on the Internet.
These arrangements are likely to trigger a chain of consequences. The scope of
routine entitlements may come to be increasingly defined not by what legislation pre-
scribes, but by what is programmed into the government's computers"' or by training
manuals for front-line personnel. Given the prevailing negative attitude towards
regulation and benefit regimes, some government agencies may yield to the tempta-
tion to deter citizens' claims and reduce their expectations by providing them with
parsimonious and discouraging information about their entitlements. Because there
will be fewer personal encounters between citizens and civil servants, there will be
less occasion for the quiet exercise of benign discretion (or, for that matter, of hostile
discretion), and less informed feedback from front-line decision-makers to their su-
periors. Deprived of personal contact with civil servants, and not much "empowered"
by what is provided in lieu, citizens will need more and more help from others in or-
29 See J. Fr6mont, "Computerized Administrative Decision Making and Fundamental Rights"
(1994) 32 Osgoode Hall L.J. 817.
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der to navigate the increasingly clogged channels of government decision-making.
However, due to cutbacks in public funding for legal aid and other advocacy services,
such help will increasingly have to be provided by volunteers and entrepreneurial,
sometimes unqualified, advisors-for-hire.
In short, more efficiency may well translate as more rights for the privileged, and
less for everyone else. This, upon reflection, is not atypical of the outcomes one
would expect in the New Economy. But it is not an outcome which could be catego-
rized as an improvement in public administration. Or rather this might be the outcome
if one assumed that formal adjudication yields rights, which is a somewhat dubious
assumption.
To illustrate: a favourite prescription of the populist right (and the populist left,
for that matter) is that abuses of state power could be curtailed if the transaction of
public business were made more transparent and if officials were made more ac-
countable." Experience so far with transparency, under freedom-of-information legis-
lation, suggests that it is particularly helpful to privileged users, such as businesses,
lobbyists and journalists who have the time and money to take advantage of it. Legal
accountability might provide similar outcomes.
Suppose a new statute or a ruling of the Supreme Court made public officials le-
gally liable for misfeasance or dereliction of duty. What would be the practical result?
No one knows, although experience to date indicates that nothing much is likely to
happen.' Courts might be reluctant to hold individuals liable. If they did impose li-
ability, the consequence might be, with equal probability, either a higher calibre of
administrative decisions or a decline in the willingness of decision-makers to decide
anything, for fear of being sued. If the courts failed to make awards against public
servants personally, they might nonetheless hold ministers and deputy ministers to a
new duty of due diligence. The result might be better public-sector management; but
based on comparable experience with corporate officers and directors, it might just as
likely be the introduction of indemnities and other legal protections to insulate them
from liability. Conceivably, when the dust settles, all that will have happened is that
the state has assumed the burden of greater accountability - damages paid to ag-
grieved citizens - as an additional "cost of doing business". If so, the outcome of this
whole legal initiative will be not a more responsive and competent public service, but
only a state weighed down with additional financial liabilities.
30 Espousing such arrangements should not be confused with actually implementing them. For ex-
ample, Ontario's Conservative government has instituted user fees for freedom-of-information re-
quests which will present a considerable barrier to ordinary citizens seeking information (see
"Government Information No Longer Free" The Ottawa Citizen (3 February 1996) A13).
, It is now almost 40 years since the landmark decision in Roncarelli v. Duplessis, [1959] S.C.R.
121, 16 D.L.R. (2d) 689, but the tort of abuse of power established in that case remains almost un-
known. As Peter Hogg notes, in this general area of government liability in tort, "the academic com-
mentary is more voluminous than the cases" (P.W. Hogg, Liability of the Crown, 2d ed. (Toronto:
Carswell, 1989) at 111, n. 159). Recent developments are reviewed in P.W. Hogg, "Compensation for
Damage Caused by Government" (1995) 6 N.J.C.L. 7.
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If more stringent rules to ensure greater openness and accountability are by no
means certain to produce wiser, faster or better-considered action by public servants,
we arrive at an important initial conclusion: law is of limited use in reshaping public
administration from the outside in because it is too inefficient and unreliable.
The second reason why law is not likely to be the strategy of choice for reforming
public administration has less to do with the practical difficulties of using law than
with the political difficulties of making it. In the New Economy, most governments of
whatever provenance are committed to reducing public spending, the size of the pub-
lic service and the state's regulatory presence. The conventional political wisdom
holds that radical reduction in public expenditure and services must be accomplished
quickly and without temporizing, if it is to succeed. 2 Sometimes - the "Contract with
America" being a good example - this strategy translates into an overt legislative as-
sault on the activist state and the clienteles and communities that it has supported.
However, the process of enacting legislation can be slow, public and, potentially, a fo-
cus for political resistance. Governments committed to such programs may therefore
try to short-circuit it. In Ontario, for example, the Conservative government attempted
to move virtually its entire legislative program through the legislature on an acceler-
ated schedule and in the form of a so-called omnibus bill." Only obstructive parlia-
mentary tactics and a general public outcry blocked this attempt, and forced the gov-
ernment to accede to public hearings lasting several weeks, during which scores of
amendments were introduced.
But legislation is not always necessary. Once a budget is adopted - which is,
obviously, a formal and public act of the legislature - what follows can be made to
appear inevitable rather than controversial, as the inexorable operation of rationing
principles which will ensure that scarce public resources are allocated in an orderly,
responsible and humane fashion. And except where overarching constitutional re-
quirements or parliamentary conventions intervene, these rationing principles can be
adopted sub rosa, without public debate or formal legislation. It is much easier to
stand down the activist state by means of orders-in-council, ministerial directives, and
subministerial decisions to reduce funding, eliminate staffing, suspend work routines
32 See R. Douglas, Unfinished Business (Auckland, N.Z.: Random House, 1993). The Conservative
government in Ontario reduced welfare payments by 20 percent by order-in-council (as it had a legal
right to do) before even meeting the legislature (see M. Mittelstaedt, "Ontario Tories Slash Spending
by $1.9-billion" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (22 July 1995) Al; M. Mittelstaedt, "Slashing
Spending Tops Conservatives' Agenda" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (28 June 1995) A5). Its an-
nouncements of intended cuts in transfer payments to municipalities and social agencies led those
agencies to begin to adopt new rules for allocating benefits long before a budget was brought down
implementing those cuts.
" Ontario's Savings and Restructuring Act, S.O. 1996, c. 1, comprises 211 pages, 400 clauses, 17
appendices, and amendments to 47 other statutes dealing with hospitals and doctors' services, envi-
ronmental controls, fishing licenses, public-service redundancies and pensions, arbitration awards,
highway tolls, municipal taxes and user fees, etc. A similar strategy was used, more successfully, by
the federal Conservatives to implement the N.A.F.T.A. treaty. See the North American Free Trade
Agreement Implementation Act, S.C. 1993, c. 44, which comprised 193 pages, 242 clauses, and
amendments to scores of statutes.
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and eviscerate programs by pursuing them perfunctorily. In this way, parliamentary
and extra-parliamentary opposition can be delayed until changes become irreversible,
deflected away from big principles onto small details, decoyed into a series of skir-
mishes amongst constituencies competing for what is left of the budget, debilitated by
having to fight so many battles in so many different venues, and thus denied all but
minimal opportunities for challenge.
The techniques of clandestine and non-statutory change are familiar. A good deal
of the substantive content of law is contained in orders-in-council and ministerial di-
rectives which can be amended or repealed. Ministries, boards and transfer agencies
can be forced to absorb budget cuts without being specifically told to eliminate given
programs; they, in turn, assign the task to sub-units where services are delivered, but
which lack authority over policy. In some cases, budgets of disfavoured agencies and
units are cut disproportionately or eliminated altogether; attrition and early retire-
ments are used to eliminate unwanted functions and troublesome employees; warn-
ings of future staff reductions generate conditions of general insecurity within the
public service; and insecurity, in turn, helps to ensure at least grudging compliance
with the new government's philosophy. Compliant attitudes are then converted into
compliant conduct: the aggressive exercise of regulatory initiative is discouraged by
managers; revised operating procedures are introduced which result in reduced levels
of service; rules-of-thumb that permit a margin of generosity in the distribution of
benefits are quietly abandoned. An enormous change in the behaviour of public ad-
ministrators can be accomplished by stealth, with a minimum of legislation and a
minimum of political risk.
Thus, for the most part, neo-conservative governments committed to a New
Economy agenda neither need, nor want, to use law to reconfigure public policies or
transform public administration. Ironically, however, by opting for more clandestine
and informal means, they may expose themselves to complaints of executive over-
reaching, similar to those that were used to attack the initiatives of the early New
Deal, the very prototype of the interventionist state they are now seeking to abolish.'
Such complaints may not have much political resonance; they may, however, be
framed as legal challenges. Orders-in-council, ministerial directives and other low
visibility changes in the mandate of public administration may be attacked on proce-
dural or jurisdictional grounds or on the basis that they violate constitutional stan-
dards. However, unlike the judicial obstruction of the New Deal in the mid-1930s,
such challenges in Canada are not likely to accomplish much more than brief delays
in the dismantling of the activist state," and perhaps the odd touch of ironic humour.
" See P.H. Irons, The New Deal Lawyers (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982); M.E. Par-
rish, "The Great Depression, the New Deal, and the American Legal Order" (1984) 59 Wash. L. Rev.
723; R.A. Maidment, The Judicial Response to the New Deal: The U.S. Supreme Court and Eco-
nomic Regulation, 1934-1936 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991).
" See e.g. Masse v. Ontario (Ministry of Community and Social Services) (1996), 134 D.L.R. (4th)
20, 89 O.A.C. 81.
1997]
MCGILL LAW JOURNAL/REVUE DE DROITDE MCGILL
In Canada, conservatives have tended to treat judicial review of administrative
action as a manifestation of the rule of law and a fundamental principle of our polity.6
By contrast, Canadian supporters of interventionist government have tended - with
reason - to see judicial review of administrative behaviour as the extension of right-
wing politics by other means." However, as suggested earlier, in the New Economy
the positions are likely to be reversed. The left will attack government "secrecy" and
"arbitrariness"; the right will defend it on grounds of urgent necessity. The right will
preach judicial deference to the will of parliamentary majorities, while the left will
extol the virtues of fundamental rights and judicial activism. In the end, however, the
courts are not likely to be much more capable of challenging the state in its dimin-
ished form than they were when it was more robust. Judicial review has always been
too slow, costly, clumsy, incoherent and unpredictable to be much use to anyone. And
as the left may ultimately recall, in addition to all of these well-advertised shortcom-
ings, judicial review has usually been more effective as a sedative for government
than as a tonic.
Thus, neo-conservative governments wishing to remake public administration in
their own image are likely to live by the principle of "law if necessary, but not neces-
sarily law". While treaties and legislation may help to invest the premises of the New
Economy with an air of legitimacy, or even inevitability, exclusive reliance on such
measures involves an unacceptable and unnecessary element of political risk. What
ultimately changes the behaviour of government are the tough practical measures
which can be generated within public administration. Government is relatively safe in
pursuing such measures, and need not be unduly concerned about rearguard actions in
the courts in defence of the activist state. In fact, from government's point of view,
they have some positive attractions: the more such actions fail, the more they may
make resistance to the New Economy agenda seem futile.
B. Enhanced Professionalism in the Public Service
Whether one favours expansion of the state or retrenchment, professionalism
would not seem to be a promising way of reforming public administration. The very
concept of professionalism has been attacked by social theorists as a project of mysti-
fication and self-aggrandizement;38 many professions - medicine, law and urban
planning, for example - are accused of doing as much harm as good; and expert pro-
fessional knowledge has been attacked as anti-democratic and self-referential. None-
3 See Ontario, Royal Commission Inquiry into Civil Rights (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1968)
(Commissioner J.C. McRuer).
"See J. Willis, "The McRuer Report: Lawyers' Values and Civil Servants' Values" (1968) 18
U.T.L.J. 351.
3 The literature is reviewed in R.L. Nelson & D.M. Trubek, "New Problems and New Paradigms in
Studies of the Legal Profession" in R.L. Nelson, D.M. Tnibek & R.L. Solomon, eds., Lawyers' Ide.
als/Lawyers' Practices: Transfornations in the American Legal Profession (Ithaca, N.Y.: Comell
University Press, 1992) 1. See also M. Sarfatti Larson, The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociological
Analysis (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977); E. Freidson, Professional Powers: A Study
of the Institutionalization of Fornal Knowledge (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986).
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theless, because "professionalism" is often used to describe the value system that is
said to prevail in at least the higher reaches of public administration, it deserves close
scrutiny.
Members of a profession are conventionally identified by their mastery of a spe-
cialized body of knowledge and skills which they put at the disposal of their client. As
a corollary, the dependency of the client on the professional and his or her knowledge
is said to impose ethical responsibilities on the professional: to advance the client's
interests at all times, to adhere to high standards of care and competence, and to ab-
stain from taking unfair advantage of the client. This description of professionals can
easily enough encompass public servants, at least at the senior levels. 9 However, pro-
fessionalism in the public sector has several distinctive features. First the "client" -
the state itself - constantly reappears in new incarnations and with new concerns un-
der succeeding governments. Second, public-sector professionals are not independent
practitioners; they work only in bureaucratic or organizational settings. And third,
there is a long-standing debate over whether public-service professionals ought to be
specialists or generalists, and whether technical credentials and extensive experience
in a particular field should be regarded as negative, rather than positive, credentials.
Each of these features presents particular problems in using enhanced professionalism
as a strategy for the reform of the public service.
However, difficulties begin with the central concept of professionalism itself: ex-
pert knowledge. We might imagine that enhanced professionalism within the public
service would be especially important at a moment when new socio-political and
techno-economic paradigms are emerging, and when the machinery of government it-
self is being transformed. However, expert knowledge seems to be in disrepute. Crit-
ics at both ends of the political spectrum are sceptical of professional expertise which,
they argue, is not neutral but value-laden, and is employed not to serve public inter-
ests and elected governments but to sabotage and dominate them. Expertise must be
diluted with a healthy dose of common sense (the right) or popular politics (the left).
But it is not just expertise which is suspect; it is the experts themselves. Incoming
governments committed to fundamental change often perceive senior public servants
as adherents of the status quo, if not of the previous regime itself. They may therefore
decide to purge or marginalize some of the most knowledgeable and competent pro-
fessionals. New recruits to senior positions may come from junior ranks, but espe-
cially in the case of governments with radical agendas, there will be a temptation to
recruit individuals from outside the public service whose ideological positions and
special professional expertise are thought to be compatible with the government's
agenda. In the New Economy, of course, an anti-state ideology and private-sector
managerial experience may be regarded as especially attractive credentials.
Professional ethics are also a problem. In most professions, ethics are transmitted
through a milange of maxims and precepts, embedded attitudes and symbolic behav-
39 Obviously, many public servants think of themselves in these terms, as evidenced by the exis-
tence of organizations such as the Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada and the Ca-
nadian Institute of Public Administration, and a host of others with specialized or local memberships.
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iours, codes and codicils. Only a very few ethical rules - honesty and competence -
are expressed in the form of clear rules, and even these are difficult to define and en-
force in hard cases. Most professions - including the public service - therefore tol-
erate a high degree of ethical ambiguity. Indeed, a characteristic of professional ethics
is that they are preoccupied with the accommodation of competing principles. Archi-
tects, for example, must somehow reconcile the Vetruvian trinity of "firmness, com-
modity and delight", lawyers, their duty to vigorously advocate their client's interests
with their duty to act as decorous "officers of the court".
In public administration, similar ambiguities and conflicts abound. For example,
public servants must obey the legislation that delimits their own mandates, powers
and procedures and defines the rights and obligations of citizens. At the same time,
they must accept direction from their "political masters", elected ministers who act
individually at the departmental level and collectively through cabinet. These two
principles often exist in tension with each other, and the mark of the ethical - the
truly "professional" - public official is that she or he knows how and when to re-
solve that tension."
Alas, the New Economy is both a rock and a hard place, where ethics will not
flourish easily. Consider the plight of senior public-service managers confronted with
the quintessential ethical dilemma of the New Economy: how to respond to an elected
government committed to a political agenda of budget cutting and free markets on the
one hand, and existing statutory mandates to regulate activity or disburse benefits on
the other? If fewer inspectors can be hired, to cite an example, the frequency of site
inspections will have to be reduced, possibly to the point where consumers' health or
workers' safety are endangered. If courtrooms are closed or legal aid is withheld, to
cite another, the result may be that accused persons are denied a fair trial within a rea-
sonable time or that spouses are denied access to divorce; the social consequences are
potentially grave." The ethical dilemma for public-sector managers is not simply how
to maintain adequate services with inadequate budgets, but also how to deal with this
question without being perceived as disloyal or obstructive.
One pathological variant of the professional civil servant's response is wickedly caricatured in the
successful British television series, Yes Minister (B.B.C., first televised 25 February 1980); another -
perhaps an ideal-type, rather than a portrait from life - is chronicled in Strangers and Brothers, C.P.
Snow's cycle of novels whose protagonist, Lewis Eliot, a law don, spends three decades in White-
hall's "corridors of power" (see C.P. Snow's novel-sequence consisting of eleven novels published
over a ten year period, beginning with Strangers and Brothers (New York: Scribner, 1960)).
"In Ontario, rumoured budget-driven reductions of up to 25 percent in the number of crown attor-
neys were resisted on the grounds that the ensuing delay in trials would cause large numbers of prose-
cutions to be discontinued or dismissed under the Askov rule (see R. v. Askov, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1199,
74 D.L.R. (4th) 355), and that withdrawal of funds would lead to termination of a project to stream-
line the processing of criminal trials and reduce the overall number of trials, which would further ex-
acerbate the problem (see M. Valpy, "Prosecutions at Risk, Crowns Warn" The [Toronto] Globe and
Mail (6 January 1996) Al). After months of controversy, the Attorney General ultimately promised
that very modest reductions in the ranks of crown attorneys would be accomplished largely by attri-
tion and that caseloads would be controlled by more selective prosecution, especially of less serious
offences (see K. Makin, "Harnick Pledges Only 'Minimal' Layoffs" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail
(22 May 1996) A3).
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To be sure, there is room for a variety of responses. Since legislation is seldom
unambiguous, and since political direction is seldom explicit, public servants actually
do have choices that are ethical, in the sense that they are neither insubordinate nor
illegal. They can thus take the high road and defend the status quo pending receipt of
direct political or statutory orders to change; or they can accept the new regime duti-
fully, find a way to do more-or-less what is expected of them without making a fuss,
and hope for better times in the future; finally, they can "get on-side" by enthusiasti-
cally embracing and advancing the government's ideology and programs.
These responses are all ethically defensible, but which most nearly conforms to
the highest professional ideals? No clear answer is to be found in any written or un-
written code. Which is to be preferred from the pragmatic perspective of defending
the public interest? The problem is that public interests conflict: elected governments
must be allowed to govern, but on the other hand, the continuity of public administra-
tion should be protected against abrupt dislocation by successive political regimes;
public debt should be reduced and economic growth promoted, but on the other hand,
vulnerable citizens should be protected against the effects of poverty and predatory
business practises. Again, there is no clear answer.
Of course, this approach assumes that ethics and a transcendent view of the public
interest drive behaviour, a somewhat dubious proposition. All professionals are sup-
posed to be self-effacing, and to protect the interests of their client in preference to
their own; all public servants are supposed to be committed to the public interest; and
both these suppositions have some resonance in reality. In fact, however, self-interest
is often a powerful determinant of behaviour. This is especially likely to be true
within public administration, where survival and advancement depend upon the fa-
vourable judgment of others - a civil-service commission, bureaucratic superiors or,
at senior levels, the "political masters". That is why calls for greater professionalism
in the public service - in the sense of greater ethical sensibility and greater devotion
to the general good - are unlikely to bear much fruit. Few public servants are likely
to respond to such calls, if by doing so they will have to oppose the ideology and po-
litical direction of the very people on whom their careers depend.
Thus, we can predict with some accuracy what will happen. Sooner or later, if the
government is determined enough and is able to sustain its popularity, it will have its
way with even the most "professional" civil servant. Legislation will be passed when
it must be; direct orders will be given to senior officials by cabinet or individual min-
isters as required; but for the most part, change will be pursued by indirection. Minis-
ters will speak to policy advisors who will speak to deputies and assistant deputies.
Recalcitrant officials will be replaced; managers will either toe the line or quietly dis-
appear into less influential or secure positions; line personnel will learn to contain
their enthusiasm for the old way of doing things and to collaborate in advancing the
new. In other words, self-interest - a grundnorm of the New Economy - will be-
come more important than arcane ethical concepts such as political neutrality, ac-
countability, integrity and conformity to law. If pursued over a lengthy period and
with sufficient bloody-mindedness, such actions will transform even the notoriously
resistant culture of public administration, and especially its professional ethics. Ulti-
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mately, a new public administration will emerge that responds - as it is bound to do
- to the new direction set by a neo-conservative government. It will be a public ad-
ministration with a new culture, a new set of values, a new professional ethic. It will
be an administration for the New Economy. Politics will have triumphed over profes-
sionalism.
C. Democratic Participation
"The real issue of our time," says a leading critic on the left, "is not less state ver-
sus more state, but rather a different kind of state." 2 Indeed, some on the left perceive
in government precisely the anti-democratic qualities that they most dislike in corpo-
rations: "Bureaucracy is the primary form of organized power ... today, and it is there-
fore a primary target for those who seek liberation from modem forms of human
domination."' Of course, bureaucracy is not without its defenders across the political
spectrum. Some view it almost as a force of nature, others as a proven instrument for
the synchronization of complex tasks. Some, indeed, claim that modem bureaucracies
no longer conform to Weber's ideal-type - or to the worst caricatures of critics.' Bu-
reaucratic organizations, they contend, whether public or private, are reflexive and
have a capacity to learn.'
However, we cannot ignore the fact that even those committed to the notion of an
interventionist state are often alienated by what they perceive to be its increasing bu-
reaucratization. Bureaucracy, they argue, depersonalizes citizens, destroys initiative,
dilutes moral agency, and subverts the practice of democratic politics. Power, they
contend, hides behind the "scientization" of public administration, and seeks to dis-
guise itself as "instrumental rationality"." Attempts to justify bureaucracy, especially
in public administration, are "theoretically impoverished, politically dangerous, and,
all too frequently, morally bankrupt."' The remedy for public - and private - bu-
reaucracy, these critics argue, is democracy: transparency and accountability, popular
participation and decentralization of power, the de-privileging of expert knowledge,
and less hierarchy in the organization of work within the administration itself.
42L. Panitch, "A Different Kind of State?" in G. Albo, D. Langille & L. Panitch, eds., A Different
Kind of State? Popular Power and Democratic Administration (Toronto: Oxford University Press,
1993) 2 at 5 [emphasis in original removed].
"3 G.E. Frug, "The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law" (1984) 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1276 at
1295.
'4See e.g. D.E Thompson, "Bureaucracy and Democracy" in G. Duncan, ed., Democratic Theory
and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983) 235.
45 See e.g. G. Teubner, Law as an Autopoietic System (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993). For a critique, see
A. Beck, "Is Law an Autopoietic System?" (1994) 14 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 401. See also D. Wolfe,
"State, Law and Economy: The Reflexive Basis of Institutions" (Workshop paper, Program in Law
and the Determinants of Social Ordering, Canadian Institute of Advanced Research, 1994)
[unpublished].
' See L. Sossin, "Redistributing Democracy: An Inquiry into Authority, Discretion and the Possi-
bility of Engagement in the Welfare State" (1994) 26 Ottawa L. Rev. 1.
4 KE. Ferguson, The Feminist Case against Bureaucracy (Philadelphia: Temple University Press,
1984) at 80, quoted in Sossin, ibiL at 8.
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There is an odd convergence here. As we have seen, many who identify with the
dominant trends of the New Economy likewise favour the radical transformation of
bureaucracy, in both the private and public sectors." Calls for "flatter" management
structures, for a culture of "organizational learning", for the "empowering" of work-
ers are as likely to come from management consultants as from neo-marxist critics,
and are as likely to be prescribed for government agencies as for corporations.'9 There
is even an eerie resonance - ideological discordance notwithstanding - between the
New Economy's prescription that public bureaucracies should be more responsive to
their "customers" or "clients", on the one hand, and the argument of leftist critics that
corporations should be more responsive to the needs and wishes of "citizens", on the
other.
What would democratization of public administration imply? Gerald Frug, a
prominent proponent of "administrative democracy", envisages a five-part reform of
government. He proposes
the transformation of the internal organization of the government to promote
workplace democracy; the creation of more effective public control of gov-
ernment administration; the decentralization of political power, and the inser-
tion of a democratic voice into the agencies of the national government that
remain after decentralization has taken place."
He also places special emphasis on the transformation of "bureaucratic conscious-
ness" which, he insists, is characterized by "anti-democratic prejudice"," a dismissive
attitude towards the possibility of accommodating the need for technical expertise
with respect for democratic values such as participation and compromise. The project
- in the words of other like-minded authors - is nothing less than the creation of a
"popular" or "democratic alternative state". 2
However, this is not an agenda that would appeal to all governments, if any. The
merest glance at Frug's manifesto (a "sketch" he calls it) reveals that most of his pro-
posals are at odds with the premises of the New Economy. Only the call for reducing
the size of the national government (of the United States, as it happens) has some
resonance. Workplace democracy, public control of administration, insertion of citi-
zens into the machinery of government: none of these is consistent with the need to
centralize and discipline public administration in order to reduce expenditures and re-
trench government activity. After all, in a democratic workplace, public servants
would have the chance to resist government initiatives that attacked their professional-
ism and their very jobs. Public control of administration, as proposed by Frug, might
reveal the current clandestine transformation of public administration which is essen-
" For an interesting account of how these views converge, see C. Pollitt, "Democracy and Bureauc-
racy" in D. Held & C. Pollitt, eds., New Forms of Democracy (London: Sage, 1986) 158.
41 See generally Frg, supra note 43.
'0 J. Frug, "Administrative Democracy" (1990) 40 U.T.L.J. 559 at 562.
See ibid. at 583ff.
"See I. Bakker & R. Miller, "Escape from Fordism - The Emergence of Alternative Forms of
State Administration and Output" in R. Boyer & D. Drache, eds., States against Markets - The Lim-
its of Globalization (London: Routledge, 1996) 334.
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tial to the implementation of a neo-conservative ideology; indeed, Frug intends it
should. And citizen voices within government - at least representative citizen voices
- might speak loudly: they would surely not speak unanimously in favour of the
slashing of public services and the retrenchment of the state's attempts to civilize
marketplace behaviour.
The transformation of bureaucratic consciousness, arguably, is what proponents
of the New Economy also seek, but clearly their "transformation" and Frug's would
yield very different outcomes. And this, in fact, is the central difficulty of most proj-
ects of democratic administration originating on the left. While proposed reforms are
couched in institutional and procedural terms, their genesis is a desire to advance
highly substantive ideologies and political agendas which are at odds with the domi-
nant trends associated with the New Economy. Conversely, the proponents of the
New Economy, for all their populist rhetoric, for all their disparagement of bureauc-
racy, for all their dismissal of failed attempts at social engineering, are committed
neither to democracy nor to public administration. The New Economy assigns a cen-
tral role to private wealth and power; it depends upon undemocratic, hierarchical de-
cision-making in both the public and private sphere; and it is indifferent - if not
hostile - to the achievement of social justice and social security, the crucial precon-
ditions of effective democratic participation.
The project of democratic administration, as sketched out by Frug and others, is
anathema not only to neo-conservatives. It does not attract much support elsewhere
across the political spectrum. Richard Simeon, a centrist committed to "making hard
decisions as if democracy matters" - that is, hard decisions about the future of the
activist state in the New Economy - argues that such decisions must emerge from
democratic politics:
[O]nly by a sustained effort to re-create a social contract more attuned to the
circumstances in which we live can we find a long-term solution to the chal-
lenges of policy and governance. That solution must be built from a process of
genuine and deep public deliberation; it must restore to citizens some sense of
control over both governments and the seemingly ineluctable economic forces
that rule their lives. It involves, therefore, a greater sense of mutual responsi-
bility, a civic sense."
For Simeon, however, a new social contract, a new civic sense, does not necessarily
imply strong democratic participation within public administration. His metaphor for
the process of coming to terms with the New Economy is that of building a bridge. To
build a bridge, he says, we need "a design, a plan, a vision ... engineers, architects,
and artisans".' Thus, while his project in its initial conception rests on initial demo-
cratic consent, and requires revalidation through ongoing democratic consultation, in
its execution, Simeon's social contract is to be the work of trained minds and skilled
hands. It is to be wrought, in other words, by the sort of public administration we al-
ways imagined that we had.
53 R. Simeon, In Search of a Social Contract: Can We Make Hard Decisions as if Democracy Mat-
ters? (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, Benefactors Lecture, 1994) at 62-63.
4 Ibid. at63.
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Frug's proposals, and others like them, are anathema to neo-conservatives. They
do not seem to attract centrists like Simeon. One must concede that, at a minimum,
they are not likely to shape the reform of public administration, at least until the left
again comes to power. And if recent experience is any guide, much of the left itself
will need to be persuaded that the principled advantages of democratic participation in
public administration will outweigh the practical costs."
D. "Reinventing" Public Administration As a Market
Government is constantly attacked on the grounds that it costs too much, and that
it is neither efficient nor effective. Auditors, ombudsmen, consultants, public-
accounts committees and academics document case after case. New governments vow
to end the profligacy and poor management of their predecessors. Populists and neo-
conservatives are confirmed in their worst fears about the state, and even those who
are comfortable with activist government are often forced to agree. Markets seem to
be the antithesis of public administration. In markets, nothing costs too much, or at
least not for long; markets expose and eradicate inefficiency, and are effective in
measuring wants and allocating resources. Thus markets - the paradigmatic institu-
tion of the New Economy - have acquired a curiously ecumenical appeal as an im-
portant response to the most egregious shortcomings of public administration.'
Proposals for "marketization" of the state are various, but all of them are designed
to subject those who provide public services to the discipline of consumer choice: de-
regulation, privatization, partnerships, out-sourcing, vouchers, use-rights, user-pay,
competitive bidding and so forth. Indeed, free trade is an ultimate form of marketiza-
tion, subjecting not only public administration but the whole polity to a similar dis-
cipline. These devices, proponents believe, will give "users" better choices, provide
them with proper signals about the true costs of what they use, eliminate perverse in-
centives and unintended forms of cross-subsidization, and ensure that providers of
public goods and services are driven to adopt the most cost-effective methods of de-
livery.
At least in some quarters, markets, like democracy, are proposed as means, not
ends, as apolitical or policy-neutral, as one-solution-fits-all. However, it is clear that
markets will have significant consequences for public administration as we know it.
There will be far less of it for one thing. For another, the functions of whatever re-
mains of the core public service will clearly be less concerned with actually providing
services and regulatory functions than with negotiating and then monitoring the new
marketized arrangements to ensure they are in fact producing the desired results at the
" For understandable reasons, proponents of democratic administration are hard-pressed to provide
examples of successful experiments which might reassure those of more conventional disposition.
Most examples come from local government, few from larger bureaucracies (see e.g. Albo, Langille
& Panitch, eds., supra note 42).
6 Some of the literature is reviewed in R. Howse, "Retrenchment, Reform or Revolution? The Shift
to Incentives and the Future of the Regulatory State" (1993) 31 Alta. L. Rev. 455; and R. Howse,
J.R.S. Prichard & MJ. Trebilcock, "Smaller or Smarter Government?" (1990) 40 U.T.L.J. 498.
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agreed price. And of course, the marketization of public administration not only pro-
ceeds from, but helps to reinforce, the notion that citizens should relate to government
essentially as consumers of the goods and services it provides or arranges for. In this
respect, marketization is the very antithesis of proposals to enhance democratic par-
ticipation in public administration.
While the state may cease to perform many functions, it does not follow that
these functions will cease to be regarded as government's responsibility. Elected gov-
ernments cannot for long hide behind privatization or other market-driven arrange-
ments. "Public" services may be privatized, hybridized or devolved, but govemment
will at least have to intervene to ensure quality, efficiency, access and equity. Poor
health care, stock-market fraud, escaping prisoners, dangerous highways, starving
children, faltering pension schemes, dysfunctional labour markets or an inaccessible
information highway will soon bring demands for government intervention. Assum-
ing that, in the New Economy, intervention cannot and will not involve resuscitation
of the interventionist state, government would have to learn how to calibrate, monitor,
coordinate and - if needs be - renegotiate private-sector provision of what used to
be public goods. It will have to set up new agencies to ensure adequate levels of pub-
lic service, and those agencies will have to develop a new repertoire of monitoring
skills and a new discourse of evaluation.
But note: these new agencies will have to be perceived as effective if marketiza-
tion of state functions is to remain a viable option for governments. "Effectiveness" in
turn implies that the state can treat business transactions as transparent, and subject
them to accountability procedures that differed from those applied in conventional
market transactions. However, insistence on transparency and accountability will not
endear the state to its private-sector partners, who are likely to resist exposure of con-
fidential business information.
Two recent controversies illustrate the point. The first involves an agreement
between the government of New Brunswick and Andersen Consulting Canada,
whereby the latter agreed to "re-engineer" the provincial Department of Human Re-
sources Development in order to achieve cost savings of $17.5 million per year in
administrative efficiencies and the reduction of ineligible payments. Only when and if
the agreed level of savings is achieved are the consultants to be paid." A considerable
public controversy erupted as the result of demands for disclosure of the terms of the
agreement, the uncertain scope of the firm's mandate and the inadequacy of controls
to ensure that the required savings were in fact achieved. The second involves the pri-
vatization of Pearson Airport in Toronto, an episode which will almost certainly affect
the way in which governments handle future privatizations, and will contribute to a
reexamination of conventions governing professionalism in the civil service and
ministerial responsibility, as well as the confidentiality of government's commercial
" See M. Staples, "Joint Initiative Creating 70 Jobs" The [Fredericton] Daily Gleaner (27 January
1995) 1.
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agreements and the nature of the obligations that attach to private providers of public
goods."
In fact, the application of market discipline to public administration may even
produce at least one consequence that advocates of this strategy would find counter-
intuitive. If we want the benefits of market discipline, we may have to accept its bur-
dens. Amongst those burdens is a considerable degree of confidentiality, which is
necessary to enable each party to a market transaction to take an arm's length position
from the other in negotiations. Or perhaps this outcome is not counter-intuitive: after
all, it is one thing to ask the state to act democratically and openly when government
is acting like government, but quite another to do so when it is acting like a broker or
an entrepreneur.
Governments committed to market strategies may therefore have to abandon even
their residual "regulatory" functions of monitoring and measuring the performance of
private-sector providers. If they do, private or hybrid intermediary institutions are
likely to fill the regulatory vacuum left by this further stage of privatization. Indeed,
many such institutions are already active, including trade associations, standards or-
ganizations, industry advisory bodies, professions, unions and consumer groups, as
well as traditional intermediaries such as lawyers, consultants and lobbyists. In one
way or another such groups keep track of the private sector's performance of public
functions (at a minimum, by complaining when such functions are not performed to
the satisfaction of their members or clients; at a maximum, by establishing and en-
forcing standards of honesty, adequate levels of service and some modicum of acces-
sibility). However, to make the obvious point, these groups are committed to their
own views of propriety, to the advancement of their own special interests and to their
own methodologies, rather than to the broad public interest or to democratic practice.
Michael Trebilcock, a strong believer in the efficacy of markets and one of the
most thoughtful Canadian proponents of "reinventing government", is generally sym-
pathetic to the proposition that the state should no longer row - it should steer.9 At
the risk of mixing metaphors, as Trebilcock himself acknowledges, this is a far cry
from the proposition that the invisible hand, rather that the state's, should rest on the
tiller. The fundamental question for public administration, then, is not "How will it get
there?" but "Where is it going?" These two questions are closely related, however, in
the sense that both must be answered in order to imagine what public administration
and public law will look like in the New Economy, in the "declining age" of the Ca-
nadian state.
5 See R. Nixon, "Pearson Airport Review" (Report to the Prime Minister, 29 November 1993).
See MJ. Trebilcock, The Prospects for Reinventing Government (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute,
1994). The metaphor is that of Osborne & Gaebler, supra note 5, whose work is the subject of Trebil-
cock's commentary.
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